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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 920150-CA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Priority #2

WILLIAM IRA LEON,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for a Second Degree Felony,
Theft, in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.

Defendant entered a plea of not-guilty to the charge

on the 3d day of January, 1992. On the 3d day of February, 1992,
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss based on his contention that he
had timely filed a Demand for Disposition of Pending Charges and
that the instant prosecution was coming to trial more than 120 days
after that Demand. The District Court denied Defendant's Motion on
the 4th day of February, 1992. The matter came before the District
Court for jury trial on the 5th day of February, 1992. Defendant
was convicted of the offense charged at that trial and was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not
1

less than one (1) year but not to exceed fifteen (15) years. Said
sentence was to run concurrently with any sentence Defendant was
then serving.

A Notice of Appeal was filed on March 6, 1992.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
a.

Was Defendants Notice requesting disposition of pending

charges properly filed pursuant to Section 77-29-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended?
b.

If the aforesaid Notice was properly

filed was it

effective against the charges in this case?
c.

Should Defendant's aforesaid Motion to Dismiss have been

granted thus preventing the outcome of this case which is now
appealed from?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
A.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.
B.
Section 77-29-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended states:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment
in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional
institution of this state, and there is pending against
the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or
information, and the prisoner shall deliver t6 the
warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any
appropriate agent of the same, a written demand
specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein
2.

it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending
charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought
to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of
written notice*
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon
receipt of the demand described in Subsection (1), shall
immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal
delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk.
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon
request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide
the attorney with such information concerning the term of
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be
requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in
Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant
or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with
the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted
any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial
within 120 days, or within such continuance as has been
granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss
the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If
the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting
attorney to have the matter heard within the time
required is not supported by good cause, whether a
previous motion for continuance was made or not, the
court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly
inform a prisoner in writing of the source and contents
of any untried indictments or informations against that
prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that
prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition
thereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged with the crime of Theft, a
First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

On December 16, 1991, a Preliminary

Hearing was held in which the Circuit Court Judge determined that
the State had met its burden of proof and had shown that there was
3.

probable cause to determined that the crime caused had taken place
and that the Defendant had committed that crime • The Circuit Court
Judge thus bound the matter over for arraignment in the District
Court. The arraignment took place in District Court on the 3d day
of January, 1992 and Defendant plead not guilty at that time. On
the 3d day of February, 1992, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss
based on his contention that he had timely filed a Demand for
Disposition of Pending Charges on January 2, 1991 and that notice
of that filing had been forwarded to the Utah County Clerk and the
Utah County Attorney on January 14, 1991 and that trial of this
matter was being held more than 120 days after that demand*

The

Utah County Attorney's office opposed Defendant's Motion on the
grounds that Defendant's Notice had been deficient because there
were no indictments or informations pending against the Defendant
at the time of its filings and because the Notice did not specify
the nature of any charge and the Court wherein the charge was
pending.

On February 4, 1992, the District Court Judge denied

Defendant's Motion using almost the exact language of the Utah
County Attorney's objection to Defendant's Motion. The matter then
came before the District Court for Jury Trial on the 5th day of
February, 1992.

Defendant was convicted at that trial and was

sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not
less than one (1) year but not to exceed fifteen (15) years. Said
sentence was to run concurrently with any sentence Defendant was
then serving.

A notice of Appeal was filed on March, 6, 1992.
4.
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submitted such a

request.

The request specified pending charges in both Utah and

Salt Lake Counties and stated that the charges pending included
Auto Theft, Armed Robbery and Burglary. The auto theft case is the
case now under appeal.

Defendant's NOTICE was then forwarded to

the clerk of the 4th District Court and the Utah County Attorney on
or about January 14, 1991, by prison authorities.

The foregoing

meets with specificity the requirements of U.C.A.

S. 77-29-1.

Subparagraph (1) of that Statute requires "a prisoner serving a
term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or other penal or
correctional institution of this state, and there is pending
against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff
or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the
same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the
court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the
pending charge."

The form provided to Defendant and submitted by

him on or about January 2, 1991, meets all the above requirements
of the Statute.
Subparagraph (1) of the Statute requires "Any warden, sheriff
or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand described in
Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded
by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested,
to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk."

The

delivery of Defendant's NOTICE to the Fourth District Court Clerk
and the Utah County Attorney on January 14, 1991, meets all the
6.
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Attorney failed to file an Information formally charging the
Defendant for some eleven months after he had actually prepared
such an Information.

The Defendant argued that such delay denied

him a right to a speedy trial under the 6th amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.

In State v. Smith the Utah

Supreme Court stated:
The Prosecutor is not required to file charges as soon as
probable cause exists, to allow prosecutor to be reasonably
satisfied that he will be able to establish suspects's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; for preaccusation delay to
constitute reversible error, delay must cause actual prejudice
to defendant's case and result in tactical advantage for prosecutor.
The standard thus set forth in Smith is satisfied by the facts
in this case.

Defendant was aware of the charges pending in this

case and specifically listed them in his NOTICE.

The County

Attorney was reasonably certain of a conviction once the charges
were filed and intentionally delayed that filing to gain a tactical
advantage over Defendant.
In the case of State v. Viles.

702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah

1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The purpose of U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1 which states that prisoner
serving a term of imprisonment is entitled to have charge brought
to trial within 120 days of prisoner's delivery to custodial
officer of written notice requesting disposition of pending charge
is to protect the constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy
trial and to compel law enforcement authorities to properly
prosecute charges against prisoners.
In this case Defendant waited more than a year to be brought
to trial in this case after serving his NOTICE. This can in no way
be considered a speedy trial.
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all

waited an additional 8 months to file the charges resulting in this
appeal.

The County Attorney's delay was without any cause except

to gain tactical advantage over the Defendant and thus to cause
actual prejudice to Defendant's cause. Upon receipt of Defendant's
NOTICE the prosecutor should have immediately filed the pending
charges in this case or determined not to do so at all. Due to the
prosecutor's failure to do so in the face of the Defendant's NOTICE
the conviction in this case should be reversed and the case
dismissed with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 1992.

DONALD E. ELKINS
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this
day of September, 1992.
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STATE v. PETERSEN

810 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Utah 421

Cite as 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991)

to conduct an investigation after a showing
of good cause. It was thereafter the responsibility of the attorney general to
"subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance and testimony under oath before any
certified court reporter, and require the
production of books, papers, documents, recordings and any other items which constitute evidence or may be relevant to the
investigation in the judgment of the attorney general or county attorney." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-22-2(1) (1980) (emphasis
added).3 Any venture beyond the realm of
relevance or the parameters of the good
cause affidavit is attributable to the attorney general, not the magistrate.
Similarly, the attorney general cannot be
said to have reasonably relied on the legislature's inadvertent abridgement of constitutional rights. The statute at issue in
Krull authorized warrantless administrative searches and was declared unconstitutional. In extending the good faith exception, the court reasoned: "Penalizing the
officer for the [legislature's] error, rather
than his own, cannot logically contribute to
the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350,
107 S.Ct. 1160, 1167, 94 L.Ed.2d 364, 375
(1987).
The officer in Krull was "simply fulfilling] his responsibility to enforce the
statute as written." Id. The legislative
grant of discretionary power to construe
and implement the Subpoena Powers Act
places the attorney general in a qualitatively different position from a patrolman enforcing a vehicle code. As the state's highest law enforcement officer, the attorney
general is expected to perform his discretionary functions within constitutional
bounds. To shield his conduct behind the
vagueness of a legislative grant of authority would be tantamount to a grant of immunity to act unconstitutionally. We conclude that a good faith exception, even if it
were adopted under our state constitution,
would be inapplicable to illegal subpoenas
3. Amended 1988 Utah Laws ch. 101, § 5; 1989
Utah Laws ch. 123, § 1.
4. The Supreme Court of Connecticut recently
held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was incompatible with its constitu-

issued to defendants' banks by the attorney general, who is chargeable for the illegality.
We leave for another day the issue of
whether to apply in appropriate circumstances a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.4
We remand to the district court with
instructions to suppress all evidence obtained from defendants' banks by illegal
subpoenas. The convictions are reversed,
and a new trial is ordered.
HALL, C.J., concurs.

United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85,
100 S.Ct. 2547, 2549, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,
731-32, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2444, 65 L.Ed.2d
468 (1980); United States v. Obregon, 748
F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir.1984). I see no
reason for us to follow suit, especially
when state constitutional rights, which we
have a peculiar obligation to protect, are at
stake.
DURHAM, J.f concurs in the
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.
STEWART, J., dissents; opinion will
follow.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring):
I concur in the opinion of Justice Howe.
I write only to address the standing question. Justice Howe implicitly accepts the
argument that defendants have standing to
raise the violation of their state constitutional privacy interests in their bank
records, even though the subpoenas which
secured that evidence were not addressed
to them. I would note explicitly for the
benefit of the bench and bar that in so
ruling, we are rejecting the arguments advanced by the State that we should follow
federal standing law and deny those not
directly subjected to the search any right
to challenge its legality. See generally
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133, 99
S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-89, 96
S.Ct. 3037, 3048-50, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).
I find this entirely appropriate. Even
where federal rights are at stake, standing
law is state law, and we are not bound to
follow federal precedent. Provo
City
Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456-57
(Utah 1989). In the area of search and
seizure, the federal courts have developed
extraordinarily restrictive doctrines that
have the effect, if not the purpose, of placing a large percentage of illegal activities
beyond the scrutiny of the courts. See
tion. State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d
58 (1990) In footnote 14 of that court's opinion, cases from many states are listed on both
sides of the question.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Bryon Dale PETERSEN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 900180.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 4, 1991.
Defendant was convicted by jury of
aggravated burglary, and two counts of
attempted second-degree murder, before
the Seventh District Court, Emery County,
Boyd Bunnell, J., and court subsequently
found defendant guilty of being habitual
offender. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that reversal
of defendant's convictions was required
due to failure of State to bring defendant
to trial within 120 days of date of delivery
• of written notice of disposition, and fact
that there was no good cause for the delay.
Reversed, charges dismissed.

1. Criminal Law «=> 1134(3)
Questions of law are reviewed by the
Supreme Court for correctness.

T t a 'i? -fAf

L>

2. Criminal Law ®=»577.10(10)
Defendant who files notice of disposition is not required to object to trial date in
order to maintain his rights under statute
requiring defendant to have charge
brought to trial within 120 days of date of
delivery of written notice of disposition.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3, 4).
3. Criminal Law <^577.10(4), 1134(3)
Trial court's decision not to dismiss for
failure to begin proceeding within 120 days
after filing of notice of disposition and its
decision to grant continuance are based on
findings of good cause, and thus same
standard of review should be applied. U.C.
A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4); Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 52(a).
4. Criminal Law «=»1134(3)
Legal determinations concerning proper interpretation of statute which grants
trial court discretion are reviewed for correctness.
5. Criminal Law «=>1158(1)
Trial court's factual determinations
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
6. Criminal Law <&=>577.16(8)
Defendants who are imL brought to
trial within 120 days of filing of notice of
disposition have nq jiurflen of proving that
they were prejudiced by delay or that prosecution was given tactical advantage to be
entitled to dismissal of charges. U.C.A.
1953, 77-29-1.
7. Criminal Law «=>577.16(5)
There was no reasonable continuance
granted to toll statutory period for bringing of case to trial after notice of disposition was filed; neither of the attorneys nor
defendant requested or was granted continuance. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3).
8. Criminal Law <3=>577.10(4)
fc
Good cause for failing to hold hearing
within 120 days of inmate's filing of notice
of disposition cannot be based on mere fact
that delay was not caused by prosecutor.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3, 4).

'"t\l *-.*?<- '-Ax£ A (££\tAi'S>
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9. Criminal Law <s»577.10(3)
Delay in bringing inmate to trial within
120 days of his filing of notice of disposition was not reasonable for specific purpose of allowing defendant and his counsel
time to resolve their conflicts; trial judge
did not feel that delay was necessary to
resolve conflict 34 days before date of trial
when defendant's counsel sought to withdraw due to continuing conflict, but rather
court appointed cocounsel and did not continue trial. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-291(3, 4).

"shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded ... to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk." Section 7729-1(1) states that a prisoner is "entitled to
have the charge brought to trial within 120
days of the date of delivery of written
notice." The Emery County Attorney received a copy of the notice of disposition.
However, for unknown reasons, no copy of
the notice was found in the trial court's
file.

On July 27, 1989, the Emery County Public Defender was appointed to represent
Petersen. Petersen was arraigned on SepKeith H. Chiara, Price, and Allen S. tember 6, 1989, and at the arraignment,
Thorpe, Castle Dale, for defendant and ap- requested that the court appoint different
pellant.
counsel because of Petersen's dissatisfacR. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, Salt tion with the public defender's handling of
his case. Petersen's request for new counLake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
sel was denied, and without objection, trial
HALL, Chief Justice:
was set for February 15, 1990, 218 days
Defendant Bryon Dale Petersen appeals after Petersen filed the notice of disposihis convictions of aggravated burglary,1 a tion.
first degree felony; of two counts of atOn January 5, 1990, Petersen's appointed
tempted second degree murder,2 both sec- counsel sought to withdraw from the case,
ond degree felonies;3 and of being a habitclaiming that he was not able to resolve
ual criminal.4
continuing conflicts with his client. On
On July 6, 1989, Petersen was charged January 12, 1990, the trial judge denied the
with burglarizing the home of Ms. Lola motion to withdraw and appointed co-counJewkes and attempting to murder Ms. sel. When Petersen's new defense counsel
Jewkes and her daughter. Petersen, hav- learned that Petersen had filed a notice of
ing been previously convicted and sen- disposition, a motion to dismiss was filed
tenced to prison for felony offenses, at on the ground that Petersen was not
least one of which was a second degree brought to trial within 120 days of the
felony, was also charged with possession of delivery of the notice. On February 15,
a firearm by a prohibited person 5 and with 1990, a hearing was held and the motion to
being a habitual criminal. On July 12, dismiss was denied.
1989, Petersen, who was being held at the
In dismissing the motion, the trial court
Utah State Prison pending a parole revocation hearing, filed a notice and request for found: (1) The county attorney had redisposition of pending charges ("notice of ceived the notice of disposition, but the
disposition"), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. court had received no notice whatsoever.
§ 77-29-1 (Supp.1989). The notice of dis- (2) The court asked Petersen whether the
position was filed with an authorized agent trial date was acceptable, and Petersen did
of the Utah State Prison. Section 77-29- not object to the date. (3) The trial date
1(2) requires that any custodial officer, was set to allow time for defendant and his
upon receipt of a notice of disposition, counsel to resolve their differences. (4)
Petersen, as a result of having his parole
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1) (Supp.1989).
2.

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp.1989).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203( 1 )(a) (Supp.1989).

3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp.1989).

5. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp.1989).
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revoked, has been incarcerated in the Utah
State Prison since the filing of the charges.
In its conclusions of law, the trial court
ruled: (1) The setting of the trial date for
February 15, 1990, occurred within the
120-day period and was for the purpose of
allowing time for Petersen and his counsel
to resolve their differences and, therefore,
constituted a continuance for good cause.
(2) Petersen waived the statutory right to a
trial within 120 days by not objecting to the
trial date. (3) Petersen had the burden of
showing that the failure to try his case
before the expiration of the statutory period resulted in prejudice to his case or tactical advantage to the prosecutor. (4) Petersen made no showing of prejudice or tactical advantage. (5) The delay was not
caused by any action or inaction of the
prosecutor.
On February 15, 1990, the date of the
trial, Petersen moved to disqualify the trial
judge on the ground that the judge had
previously, as a district attorney, prosecuted defendant and had recused himself
from presiding over a trial of defendant in
December of 1981. The court denied this
motion on the ground that it was not timely
made.
The aggravated burglary charge and the
two attempted murder charges were tried
to a jury on February 15 and 16. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.
Following the verdict, defendant waived a
jury trial on the charge of being a habitual
criminal. The court subsequently found
defendant guilty of this charge. The
charge of unauthorized possession of a
handgun was dismissed. Petersen was
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than five years nor more than life on
each one of the four charges, such terms to
run consecutively.

There are three issues presented on appeal. First, Petersen claims that all his
convictions should be reversed and all
charges dismissed with prejudice due to the
State's failure to bring him to trial within
120 days of the date on which the notice of
disposition was delivered to the county attorney. Second, Petersen claims that if
this court does not dismiss the charges, he
is entitled to a new trial on the grounds of
bias and prejudice on the part of the trial
judge. Third, the State, on its own motion,
asserts that Petersen was improperly sentenced and asks that the case be remanded
for resentencing.6
Petersen's claim that his convictions
should be reversed and the charges against
him dismissed with prejudice is based on
section 77-29-1, 7 which reads in pertinent
part:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a
term of imprisonment in the state prison
... and there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment
or information, and the prisoner shall
cause to be delivered to the warden ...
or any appropriate agent of the same, a
written demand specifying the nature of
the charge and the court wherein it is
pending and requesting disposition of the
charge, he shall be entitled to have the
charge brought to trial within 120 days
of the date of delivery of written notice.

6. See State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1374
(Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071,
1074 (Utah 1989); State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137,
144-45 (Utah 1989) (all holding that the habitual
criminal statute does not create a separate
crime but operates as an enhancing statute); see
also Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (Supp.1989)
(second degree murder is a first degree felony);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp.1989) (attempted second degree murder is a second degree felony); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2)

(Supp.1989) (second degree felony is punishable
by an indeterminate period of not less than one
nor more than fifteen years).

(3) After written demand is delivered
as required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his
counsel, for good cause shown in open
court, with the prisoner or his counsel
being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not
brought to trial within 120 days, or with-

7. Petersen does not claim that his constitutional
rights to a speedy trial were violated. See U.S.
Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The
right afforded by the Utah Constitution is also
guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(f)
(Supp.1989).
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in such continuance as has been granted,
and the defendant or his counsel moves
to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good
cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court
shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice.
y
[1] The threshold issue, in determining
whether Petersen's convictions should be
reversed pursuant to section 77-29-1, is
whether the trial court erred in ruling that
Petersen waived his rights under the statute by not objecting to the trial date.
Whether criminal defendants, after filing
notices of disposition, are required to affirmatively assert their rights under section 77-29-1 is a question of statutory construction and, therefore, a question of law.
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. 8
[2] This court has held that criminal
defendants have no such duty to object
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-65-1 to -2
(Supp.1953) (amended 1980), the predecessor to section 77-29-1. 9 In so holding, we
stated, "[I]t is apparent that the legislature
intended to place the burden of complying
with the statute on the prosecutor." ,0 The
language in section 77-29-1 compels the
same conclusion.
Section
77-29-1(4)
states, "If the court finds that the failure
of the prosecuting attorney to have the
matter heard within the time required is
not supported by good cause . . . the court
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice." n This language clearly places the
burden of complying with the statute on
the prosecutor. Therefore, Petersen, after
8. E.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (statutory construction
is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness); Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d
933, 934 (Utah 1988) (statutory construction is a
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness).

filing his notice of disposition, was not required to object to the trial date in order to
maintain his rights under section 77-29-1.
[3] Since Petersen did not waive his
rights, the determination of whether his
convictions should be reversed is dependent
on whether, in accordance with section 7729-1(3), a "reasonable continuance" was
granted for "good cause shown" or whether, in accordance with section 77-29-1(4),
the trial judge properly found that the
"failure of the prosecuting attorney to
have the matter heard within the time required is supported by good cause." Before reaching these questions, however, it
is important to note that we have interpreted both section 77-29-1 and its predecessor
as granting discretion to the trial court.12
Specifically, in State v. Bonny 13 we held
that sections 77-65-1 to -2 (1953) (amended
1980) granted trial courts the authority to
make reasonable determinations concerning the existence of good cause.
"[F]or a good cause shown in open
court ... the court having jurisdiction
in the matter may grant any necessary
or reasonable continuance."
The emphasized language of the statute just
quoted makes it clear that if there is a
reasonable basis in the record to support
the proposition that the trial court granted a continuance "for good cause shown"
it was within [the trial court's] discretion
and authority to do so.14
In stating this standard of review, the
court relied on language that is consonant
with the language of section 77-29-1(3);
accordingly, the same standard should apply to the present statute. Although the
predecessor to section 77-29-1 did not have
a provision parallel to section 77-29-1(4),
the decision not to dismiss under section
11. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (emphasis added).
12. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah
1982) (per curiam) (interpreting section 77-291); State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147,
147-48 (1970) (interpreting section 77-65-1).

9. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158,
160 (1969).

13. 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970).

10. Id.

14. Id, 477 P.2d at 147-48 (emphasis in original).

^

77-29-1(4) is based on a finding of "good
cause," as is the decision to grant a continuance under section 77-29-1(3). Therefore,
the same standard of review should be
applied to both subsections 77-29-1(3) and
<4).'5
[4,5] Before reviewing the record to determine if there is a reasonable basis for
the trial court's judgment, however, it is
necessary to make primary determinations
concerning the content of the record. It is
to be noted that trial courts do not have
discretion to misapply the law.16 Therefore, legal determinations concerning the
proper interpretation of the statute which
grants the trial court discretion are reviewed for correctness. 17 Similarly, the trial court's factual determinations will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 18 It is
only after these primary determinations
are made that the record can be reviewed
for the existence of a reasonable basis for
the proposition that good cause existed for
the continuance or the delay.
[6] The record supports the trial court's
factual findings. In its conclusions of law,
however, the trial court erred in rulings
concerning the correct interpretation and
application of section 77-29-1. Specifically, the trial court ruled that under section
77-29-1, Petersen had the burden of proving that the delay prejudiced his case or
gave the prosecution a tactical advantage.
Although the fact that the delay works to
the disadvantage of a defendant may be a
15. See State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d at 405.
16. See 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 772
(1962); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 111 (1957).
17. See Hancock v. Planned Development Corp.,
791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) (trial court does
not have discretion to grant new trial absent
one of the grounds specified in the rule); Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390,
391 n. 2 (1964) (trial court does not have discretion to grant new trial absent one of the
grounds specified in the rule); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 772 (1962) (trial court has no
discretion to misapply the law); 4 C.J.S. Appeal
and Error § 111 (1957) (trial court has no discretion on question of own power); see also,
e.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (statutory construction

reason for not finding "good cause," nothing in section 77-29-1, its predecessor, or
any of the case law under either statute
requires a showing of prejudice in order for
the charges against a defendant to be dismissed. On the contrary, section 77-29-1
clearly provides that if there is not good
cause for the delay, the court shall order
the matter dismissed. The statute makes
no mention of the effect of the delay. The
only support the State cites for the trial
court's position is a case dealing with &#"**)
constitutional right to a speedy t r i a l t ^
However, we have never used the same
approach in cases decided under section
77-29-1 or its predecessor as we have used
in constitutional cases^°y The conclusion
that Petersen did not carry his burden of
showing prejudice, therefore, cannot be
used to support the finding of good cause.
I7J It is also to be noted that the trial
court erred in ruling that a reasonable continuance was granted tolling the statutory
period. Section 77-29-1(3) sets out requirements that must be met before trial judges,
in their discretion, may grant continuances
that toll the time in which a defendant
must be tried under section 77-29-1. This
section provides that "the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel . . .
may be granted any reasonable continuance." It is clear from the record that
neither of the attorneys nor defendant requested or was granted a continuance.
The requirements of the statute not being
is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness); Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d
933, 934 (Utah 1988) (statutory construction is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness). See generally State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d
361, 453 P.2d 158, 160 (1969) (supreme court
interprets sections 77-65-1 to -2 (1953) (amended 1980) and grants no deference to trial court's
ruling).
18. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Sweeney Land Co. v.
Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990).
19. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1327-31 (Utah
1986).
20. See State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d
274, 276 (1972) (rights under section 77-65-2
(amended 1980) are distinct from constitutional
rights to speedy trial).
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met, the trial court erred in concluding that
a continuance was granted under section
77-29-1(3).
This fact, however, is not fatal to State's
case. Section 77-29-1(4) states that if a
motion to dismiss is brought, the trial court
shall review the proceedings. "If the court
finds that the failure of the prosecuting
attorney to have the matter heard within
the time required is not supported by good
cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall
order the matter dismissed with prejudice."
This language makes it clear that it is the
finding of good cause that is dispositive
and not the actual granting of a continuance. The court did find that there was
good cause for the delay in that the trial
was set to allow time for defendant and his
counsel to resolve their differences. The
finding of good cause is also supported by
the court's conclusion that the delay was
not caused by an action or inaction of the
prosecutor.
[8] As the State points out, this court
has upheld trial court findings of good
cause that were supported, at least in part,
by the fact that the delay was not caused
by action or inaction of the prosecutor. 21
However, this factor alone has never been
considered dispositive. In the past, we
have reversed a trial court's decision not to
dismiss, notwithstanding the fact that the
delay was not caused by the prosecutor. 22
Furthermore, in the cases cited by the
State, there are other reasons for the finding of good cause, such as a request on the
part of the defense for a continuance 23
21. See State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348. 349 (Utah
1985) (concerning the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (Supp.
1984)); State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah
1985); State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah
1982) (per curiam); State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d
115, 116 (Utah 1982).
22. See State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d
158, 159-60 (1969). Although Wilson was decided under the previous statute, as noted above
the standard for allowing a case to be tried
beyond the required time, good cause, is the
same under both statutes.
23. State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d at 349; State v.
Buttock, 699 P.2d at 756; State v. Velasquez, 641
P.2d at 116.

and/or a relatively short delay caused by
unforeseen problems arising immediately
prior to trial.24 In any event, to hold that
good cause is supported by the lone fact
that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) which places the burden of
complying with the statute on the prosecution.
[9] It is necessary, therefore, to examine the trial court's conclusion that the
delay was reasonable because it was for
the specific purpose of allowing defendant
and his counsel time to resolve their conflicts. In some circumstances, conflicts between defendants and their counsel may
justify delay. It is to be noted, however,
that in the instant case the trial court became aware of the problems 57 days after
the notice of disposition was filed. Arguably, this problem could have been resolved
within the time allotted by the statute.
Indeed, a review of the record makes it
clear that the trial judge did not feel that
such a delay was necessary. When Petersen's counsel, due to continuing conflicts,
sought to withdraw 34 days prior to trial,
the court denied the motion, appointed cocounsel, and did not continue the trial. In
the order appointing co-counsel, the court
stated that it did "not wish to delay the
trial because of any such conflict." Since a
delay was not necessary to resolve the
conflict 34 days before the date of trial, a
fortiori, a delay was not necessary to resolve the conflict approximately 63 days
before the running of the statutory period.25
24. State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d at 756; State v.
Trujillo, 656 P.2d at 405.
25. The statute requires that a defendant be tried
within 120 days of the time the notice is delivered, not filed. See § 77-29-1(1); see also State
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 312-13 (Utah 1975)
(dealing with section 77-65-2). Since the
record does not reveal when the notice of disposition was delivered to the county attorney, it is
impossible to determine the exact date the statutory period ran. However, nothing in the
record indicates that the notice of disposition
was not delivered within a reasonable time as
required by the statute. See § 77-29-1(2); see
also State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d at 312-13.

Due to our holding regarding section 7729-1, we do not reach the other issues in
the case. However, we feel compelled to
again comment on the propriety of trial
judges' presiding over criminal trials when
they have previously prosecuted the defendants. In State v. Neeley, w a case that
also dealt with a judge who presided over a
trial of a defendant whom he had previously prosecuted, we stated:

[A] judge should recuse himself when
his "impartiality" might reasonably be
questioned. Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 3(C)(1)(b) (1981). This standard set
forth by the Code of Judicial Conduct
should be given careful consideration by
the trial judge. It may require recusal in
instances where no actual bias is
shown
[T]he integrity of the judicial
system should be protected against any
taint of suspicion.... [W]e recommend
the practice that a judge recuse himself
where there is a colorable claim of bias
30
or prejudice
We went on to hold that although judges
should recuse themselves if there are colorable claims of bias or prejudice, absent a
showing of actual bias, "failure to do so
does not constitute reversible error as long
as the requirements of section 77-35-29
[current version at Utah R.Crim.P. 29] have
been met." 3 I
The instant case, however, is more troubling than Neeley. In this case, the trial
judge, upon receiving the affidavit alleging
prejudice, did not have a second judge rule
on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit as
required by rule 29(d), but summarily dismissed the motion on the ground that it
was untimely. We are aware of the problems that arise when motions to disqualify
are filed the day of trial and stress that we
are not deciding the issue of whether the
requirements of rule 29 must be complied
with under such circumstances. However,
because the motion to disqualify was summarily dismissed, we are without a record
sufficient to enable us to determine whether the affidavit was filed "as soon as practical" and "in good faith" as required by
rule 29(c). It is also to be observed that,
assuming the trial judge was aware of his
prior contact with Petersen, the problem
could have been avoided had the judge followed our recommendation in Neeley and,

26. 699 P.2d 753 (Utah 1985).

29. 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988).

It should also be noted that there was a
long delay inasmuch as the trial date was
set for 218 days beyond the time defendant
filed the notice of disposition. Given the
fact that the record reveals that the trial
court felt the delay was unnecessary, such
a long delay cannot be considered reasonable. The conclusion that the delay was
for the purpose of allowing time for defendant and his counsel to resolve their conflicts, therefore, cannot be used to support
a reasonable basis for the finding of good
cause.
The State contends that in State v. Bullock, 26 this court upheld a finding of good
cause under similar facts. Bullock, however, is easily distinguishable from the instant case. First, in Bullock the defense
counsel moved for a continuance because
he was ill on the date of trial.27 In the
instant case, there was no motion for a
continuance and the conflict did not arise
shortly before trial. Second, in Bullock
the continuance only delayed the trial 13
days beyond the original trial date. 28 In
the instant case, the trial was delayed over
90 days from the running of the statutory
period. A review of the proceeding, therefore, does not reveal a reasonable basis for
the finding of good cause. Accordingly,
pursuant to section 77-29-1, Petersen's
convictions should be reversed and the
charges against him dismissed with prejudice.

27. Id. at 756.
28. Id. In Bullock, there was no record of the
delivery of the notice of disposition. Therefore,
it is impossible to determine how much time
passed between the delivery of the notice and
the trial.

30. Id. at 1094 (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 1094-95.
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on his own motion, recused himself due to
the colorable claim of prejudice.
Pursuant to our holding regarding section 77-29-1, the convictions are reversed
and the charges are dismissed with prejudice.
IOWE, A.C.J., and STEWART,
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

SYS«M>

Mary M. THRONSON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
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Charles H. THRONSON, Defendant
and Appellee.
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In a divorce action, the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, David S. Young,
J., entered a divorce decree and awarded
joint legal custody of the parties' child,
child support, alimony and property division. Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) amendments to child custody statute deleting rebuttable presumption favoring joint legal
custody was a substantial and substantive
amendment and thus could not be applied
retroactively; (2) court abused discretion in
imposing joint legal custody on parents
without statutorily required parental
agreement; (3) findings were inadequate to
support child custody award; (4) child support award had to be reconsidered including income from nonearned sources and
husband's current earnings in making calculations; and (5) wife was entitled to alimony of $800 per month on a permanent
basis, rather than for only one year.

THRONSON v. THRONSON

Utah

429

CHe as 810 P.2d 428 (UtahApp. 1991)

Remanded in part, modified in part and
otherwise affirmed.

1. Parent and Child <£=»3.3(1)
Amendments to child custody statute
deleting rebuttable presumption favoring
joint legal custody was a substantial and
substantive amendment and thus could not
be applied retroactively. U.C.A.1953, 303-10.2.
2. Divorce <S=>299
Trial court abused its discretion in imposing order of joint legal custody on parents and child without statutorily required
parental agreement and in the face of parental opposition. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.1 to
30-3-10.4.
3. Divorce <3=>301
Findings were inadequate to support
child custody award where court utilized
best interest factors related to joint legal
custody, not those related to child custody,
findings were in conflict as to whether
court or parents should determine visitation rights, findings did not support award
of any physical custody, and custody was
awarded on the basis of court imposed visitation time allocation. U.C.A.1953, 30-310, 30-3-10.2(3).
4. Divorce <3=>306
In determining appropriate child support award, parental income had to include
consideration of income from nonearned
sources, as well as current earnings of
husband, rather than average of husband's
earned income over several years. U.C.A.
1953, 78-45-7.4, 78-45-7.5, 78-45-7.5(l)(a),
(5)(b), 78-45-7.5 to 78-45-7.7.
5. Divorce <s=>240(2)
Award of $800 alimony to wife on a
permanent basis, rather than for only one
year, was warranted based on consideration of wife's earning capacity as a fulltime pharmacist and her necessary monthly
living expenses, and husband's current
gross capacity and his actual and necessary
monthly living expenses.

Paul H. Liapis (argued), Helen E. Christian, Kim M. Luhn, Gustin, Green, Stegall
& Liapis, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant

ther relevant facts will be set forth below
in our treatment of the respective issues.

Clark W. Sessions (argued), Dean C. Andreasen, Campbell, Maack & Sessions, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellee.

Ms. Thronson challenges the joint legal
custody decree and order on two grounds:
(1) She did not agree to the order of joint
legal custody and Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-10.2 (1989) required the agreement
of both parents at the time of this decree
and order. (2) The provision for an automatic award of sole custody to one parent
when the other moves from the state was

Before BENCH, GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION

CHILD CUSTODY AWARD

JACKSON, Judge:
Mary Thronson appeals provisions of a
divorce decree and separate order awarding joint legal custody of a child, child
support, alimony, and property. We remand for further proceedings regarding
child custody and support. We modify the
alimony award and affirm the remainder of
the decree.
FACTS
The parties were married on September
30, 1978. Their marriage was the first for
both. She was a full-time pharmacist and
he a full-time attorney. A son was born to
them on September 11, 1981. She became
the child's primary caretaker and a parttime pharmacist. He became a shareholder
in his law firm. She filed a complaint for
divorce. He filed a counterclaim for divorce. They were divorced by a decree
entered June 23, 1989. A separate order of
joint legal custody was also entered. Fur1. Custody terminology: Many legislators, judges
and writers have been loose with their "joint"
custody language. Early articles identified this
vexing problem as follows:
Both the forms of custody [sole, divided, split,
joint] following divorce and the terms which
describe them are vague and overlapping.
The lack of standard definitions and the
courts' tendency to use certain terms interchangeably have created confusion.
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children
Following Divorce, 12 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 523, 525
(1979).
Often, when referring to one of these custody
arrangements, courts use vague language or
inadequately defined terms.
Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky.L.J. 271, 283 (197879).

CHILD CUSTODY IN UTAH
Prior to 1988, Utah did not have a statute
expressly authorizing an award of "joint
legal custody" l of a child. Our divorce
statutes have contained various child custody provisions since 1903. For many years
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989) has authorized district courts to include in divorce
decrees "equitable orders relating to the
children, property and parties." Further,
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 has contained
various specific provisions regarding
factors to be considered in awarding sole
custody of a child. See Lembach v. Cox,
639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981); 1 Utah L.Rev.
363 (1989) (historical development of child
custody factors and preferences in Utah).
"Joint Legal Custody" was specifically
added to the sole custody statute in 1988,
and designated as § 30-3-10.1 to -10.4.
We emphasize that this is a joint "legal"
custody statute and not a joint "physical"
One author points out that considerable semantic confusion has resulted possibly because
the "term" joint custody predates the "concept"
of joint custody as it is known today. He states:
"I have encountered at least fifteen terms used
to refer to various alternatives to sole custody:
joint legal custody, joint physical custody, divided custody, separate custody, alternating custody, split custody, managing conservatorship,
possessory conservatorship, equal custody,
shared custody, partial custody, custody 'given
to neither party to the exclusion of the other,'
temporary custody, shifting custody, and concurrent custody." Miller, Joint Custody, 13(3)
Fam.L.Q. 345, 360 n. 79 (1979).
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Subsection (3) following immediately after can be seen to be relating to and modifying subsection (2). The intent can thus
be seen to be that counties bear the costs
of incarcerating persons charged with or
convicted of crimes arising in the county
and prosecuted by the county attorney.
The defendants, however, argue that the
provision of section 17-22-8 which requires
the county to pay expenses incurred in
incarcerating prisoners, except those prisoners who are prisoners under civil process
(§ 17-22-10) and state felons who are sentenced to serve in the county jail (§ 17-228.5), limit the county from collecting expenses from any other entity. However,
the cities admit that section 17-22-9 (federal prisoners) and section 10-13-23 (town
prisoners), neither of which is mentioned in
section 17-22-8, require that the county be
compensated for the expense of boarding
those prisoners. Therefore, it is only reasonable that the cities also could be required to compensate the county for incarceration of city prisoners even though such
a requirement is not specifically mentioned
in section 17-22-8.
The judgment is, therefore,

affirmed.

STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

The STATE of Utah, By and Through
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT O F SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Tirso TOLEDO, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 20059.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 12, 1985.

tain reimbursement of public funds expended for support of child. On putative father's motion, the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., dismissed complaint for failure to join indispensable party. State appealed, and the
Supreme Court held that child's mother
was not indispensable party required to be
joined by State.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Social Security and Public Welfare
Mother of child born out of wedlock
was not indispensable party in action by
State against putative father to obtain reimbursement of public funds expended for
support of child. U.C.A. 1953, 78-45a-5(2),
78-45b-3, 78-45b-3(2); Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 19(a).
2. Social Security and Public Welfare
Where putative father moved to join
mother as party in State's action to obtain
reimbursement of funds expended for child
support, and State stipulated that it had no
objection, putative father could not obtain
dismissal of complaint for State's failure to
join mother, even assuming she was indispensable party. U.C.A. 1953, 78-45a-l et
seq.

Ted Cannon, Co. Atty., Sandy Mooy,
Asst. Co. Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Tirso Toledo, pro se.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from an order of the
district court dismissing plaintiffs comState brought action against putative plaint for failure to join an indispensable
father of child born out of wedlock to ob- party.

plaintiff brought this action under the share a joint interest. By accepting supUniform Act on Paternity l to obtain reim- port on behalf of her child, the mother has
bursement of public funds expended for assigned to plaintiff the right to collect
U.C.A.,
1953, § 78-45b-3.
the support of a minor child. The com- support.
plaint was supported by an affidavit of the Hence, although the child's mother may be
child's mother naming defendant as the a necessary witness, she is not an indis4
child's father. Defendant filed an answer pensable party.
denying paternity. After discovery (includ[2] Finally, for even a broader reason,
ing blood tests), the matter was certified
dismissal in the instant case was not warfor trial. Thereafter, defendant moved to
ranted. Defendant moved to join the mothjoin the child's mother as an indispensable
er as a party, and the plaintiff stipulated
nartv and plaintiff stipulated that it had no " "° " F ?
. . . .
p«Hty,
r
. . • • n r J A. I *
that it had no objection,
Having indicated
J
objection to the joinder. 1 Defendant later
that he would join the mother, defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint on the
cannot fairly argue that the complaint
ground that plaintiff had failed to join an
should be dismissed for plaintiffs failure
indispensable party—the child's mother.
to join the mother.
The trial court granted defendant's motion,
3
The order of dismissal is reversed, and
and plaintiff appealed.
the case is remanded for trial. No costs
[1] U.C.A., 1953, § 78-45a-2 provides
awarded.
that "[pjaternity may be determined upon
the petition of the mother, child, or the
public authority chargeable by law with the
f KErNUMMR SYSHM>
, 2 jT^1***
support of the child." Of similar import is
*****
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-45a-5(2), which specifically provides that "the state department
of social services may proceed on behalf of
the obligee or in its own behalf pursuant to
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
the provisions of chapter 45b of this title to
Respondent,
enforce that right of support against the
obligor." A pertinent provision of chapter
v.
45b (U.C.A., 1953, § 78-45b-3(2)) provides
Robert Steven SMITH, Defendant
that "[f]or purposes of prosecuting any
and Appellant.
action pursuant to this act, the department
No. 19053.
shall be deemed a real party in interest
upon the payment of any support." PlainSupreme Court of Utah.
tiff in the instant case is therefore statutorily authorized to proceed solely on its own
March 13, 1985.
behalf.
Nothing in our Rules of Civil Procedure
requires a contrary result. Utah R.Civ.P.
19(a) provides that "persons having a joint
interest shall be made parties and be
joined—" In the instant case, however,
Plaintiff and the child's mother do not

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, David B.
Dee, J., of attempted burglary and robbery,
and defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court held that: (1) defendant's speedy trial right did not attach a t time of imprison-

*• U.C.A., 1953, § 78-45a-l, et seq.

3. Defendant has elected not to file a brief on
appeal.

' n i t s brief on appeal, plaintiff represents that
defendant's motion was granted at an unreported hearing. For the purposes of this appeal, we
will assume the motion was never ruled upon
«nce there is nothing in the record to indicate
either a grant or a denial of the motion.

4. See Provident Bank v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
88 S.Ct. 733, 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (1968).

712

Utah

699 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ment, and (2) defendant's speedy trial
rights were not violated by prosecutor's
delay in filing information.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law «=»577.9
Defendant's speedy trial right did not
attach at time of incarceration where incarceration was for a parole violation, rather
than for the new charges. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 6.
•-. 2. Indictment and Information <s=>4.5
Prosecutor is not required to file
charges as soon as probable cause exists,
to allow prosecutor to be reasonably satisfied that he will be able to establish suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; for
preaccusation delay to constitute reversible
error, delay must cause actual prejudice to
defendant's case and result in tactical advantage for prosecutor. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 5, 6.
3. Indictment and Information <s=>4.5
Vacation time of a prosecutor in a multiple prosecutor office is not a valid excuse
for failing to speedily file charges. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
4. Indictment and Information «=>42
Where prosecutor obtained no tactical
advantage over defendant because of onemonth delay in filing information prepared
but not filed until after prosecutor's vacation, or other delays resulting in a total
delay of approximately 11 months after
demand for disposition of detainer, delay
did not violate defendant's right to reasonably prompt filing of the charges against
him. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 6; U.C.A.
1953, 77-29-1.

Thomas McCormick, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Stephen Mikita, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger Blaylock, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The defendant was convicted of the
crimes of attempted burglary and robbery
which he committed while he was on a
work release program from the Utah State
Prison. He argues on appeal that the conviction should be reversed because he was
denied a speedy trial. The information was
not filed until eleven months after he was
reincarcerated for violating parole. We affirm.
The defendant, Robert Steven Smith, had
been committed to the Utah State Prison
and subsequently transferred to a half-way
house on work release status. On October
15, 1981, the police arrested the defendant
for being in violation of his half-way house
status because he was at a location not
related to his work release, he was with
people he was not supposed to be with, and
it was suspected that he was involved in a
conspiracy to commit a robbery.
From October 1981 to March or April
1982, the police sought evidence to corroborate the statements of witnesses to the
attempted robbery. Defendant's case was
investigated along with some others involving a related group of perpetrators, against
whom the county attorney intended to file
charges at the same time. The defendant
filed a demand for disposition of detainer in
late October, 1981. See U.C.A., 1953, section 77-29-1. Investigation of the cases
continued after March or April, 1982, but
no new evidence related to defendant's case
was obtained.
In July 1982, the county attorney prepared an information charging the defendant with attempted robbery and burglary.
Since he planned to go on vacation from
August 20 through September 6, 1982, the
county attorney did not file the information
until September 7, 1982, to avoid having
other prosecutors unfamiliar with the case
handle the preliminary hearing. The defendant argues that the eleven-month delay
from arrest to trial violated his right to a
speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

STATE v. SMITH
Cite MM 699 PM 711 (Utah 1985)

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial" 1° United States v. Marion, 404
US.' 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468
(1971), the Supreme Court held that the
"speedy trial provision has no application
until the putative defendant in some way
becomes an 'accused.' " Id. at 313, 92 S.Ct.
at 459. In that case, the defendants were
indicted in 1970 for acts occurring between
1965 and 1966. They argued that the preaccusation delay between the last alleged
criminal act and the indictment violated
their Sixth Amendment right. The United
States Supreme Court rejected the contention, stating that "it is either a formal
indictment or information or else the actual
restraints imposed by arrest and holding to
answer a criminal charge that engage the
particular protections of the speedy trial
provision of Sixth Amendment." Id. at
320, 92 S.Ct. at 463. The Court reasoned
that until either indictment or arrest occurs, "a citizen suffers no restraints on his
liberty and is not the subject of public
accusations; his situation does not compare
with that of a defendant who has been
arrested and held to answer." Id. at 321,
92 S.Ct. at 463.
[1J In this case, the defendant was arrested in October 1981 for violation of his
work release status and conspiracy to commit robbery. His subsequent imprisonment was not for the purpose of insuring
his appearance at the trial for the robbery
and attempted burglary charges. Rather,
the reincarceration was for his violation of
the conditions of parole. Since his imprisonment was for a parole violation, his
speedy trial right did not attach at the time
of his reincarceration. Cf. State v. Dudl
*V, Me., 433 A.2d 711 (1981) (time served
for probation violation not counted in
speedy trial analysis); Mackey v. State, 279
Ark. 307, 651 S.W.2d 82 (1983) and State v.
Ogden, 21 Wash.App. 44, 584 P.2d 957
<l9?8) (time served for parole violation not
punted for purposes of speedy trial statute); United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d
^f9 (9th Cir.1976) and United States v.
We, 527 F.2d 386 (5th Cir.1976) (adminis-
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trative segregation within prison does not
amount to arrest for Sixth Amendment
purposes).
The defendant also argues that his right
to due process was violated by the prosecutor's failure to file the charges promptly.
He relies on United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752
(1977) which addressed the relationship between the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Speedy Trial Clause of
the Sixth Amendment when the prosecutor
delays filing charges of criminal conduct.
The Court held that when a prosecutor
delays filing an indictment, the delay does
not constitute a violation of due process
unless there is a showing that the prosecutor's delay "violates those 'fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base
of our civil and political institutions,' and
which define 'the community's sense of fair
play and decency.'" Id. at 790, 97 S.Ct.
2048 (citations omitted). "[PJrosecutors
are under no duty to file charges as soon
as probable cause exists but before they
are satisfied they will be able to establish
the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. at 791, 97 S.Ct. at 2049.
[2] A hard and fast rule that a prosecutor must file charges as soon as he has
probable cause could result in the charging
of innocent persons. Such a rule could also
result in the acquittal of guilty persons by
hampering the investigation of crimes.
Therefore, a prosecutor is not required to
file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before the prosecutor is reasonably
satisfied that he will be able to establish
the supsect's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt Id. For preaccusation delay to constitute reversible error, the delay must
cause actual prejudice to the defendant's
case and result in atactical advantage for
the prosecutor. See~~Uniled STatefr^Revada, 574 F.2d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir.1^78).
[3,4] In thifc-raser-the- tria+xoUrt found
that from October 1981 to March or April,
1982, the police were engaged in gathering
corroborative evidence. Although the defendant disputes this finding, he cites no

'i
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contrary evidence and we are therefore
compelled to accept it. The trial court
ruled that there was no valid reason for the
prosecutor's failure to file charges from
March or April to September, except for
the one month during which the prosecutor
was on vacation. We do not agree that the
vacation time of a prosecutor in a multiple
prosecution office is a valid excuse for failing to file charges. Nevertheless, the
court found, and the defendant does not
dispute, that the prosecutor obtained no
tactical advantage over the defendant because of the delay or prejudiced defendant
by allowing the evidence to become prejudically stale. On the circumstances of this
case we hold that the delay did not violate
the defendant's right to a reasonably
prompt filing of the charges against him.
Affirmed.

Elden C. KIMBALL, aka Eldon C.
Kimball, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Lewis E. CAMPBELL, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18904.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 27, 1985.
Lienholder brought action against another lienholder for breach of lien release
agreement. The Second District Court,
Weber County, John F. Walhquist, J., entered judgment awarding plaintiff damages, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1)
parol evidence that explained parties' intent
and did not contradict terms of written
contract was properly considered, and (2)
testimony by one lienholder was sufficient

to support finding that delivery of lien release by him was not condition precedent to
payment of $10,000 by other lienholder.
Affirmed.

©

Contracts <s=»176(l)
Contract's interpretation may be either
a question of law, determined by the words
of the agreement, or a question of fact,
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent.
2. Appeal and Error «=>842(8), 1008.1(10)
If trial court interprets contract as a
matter of law, Supreme Court accords its
construction no particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness standard;
however, if contract is not an integration or
is ambiguous and trial court proceeds to
find facts respecting the intentions of the
parties based on extrinsic evidence, then
review is strictly limited.
3. Evidence e»450(5)
Parol evidence which explained intent
of parties to lien release agreement and did
not contradict terms of written contract
was properly considered where writing was
ambiguous with respect to timeliness and
order of parties' performance.
4. Contracts «=>221(1)
Whether a promise is conditional depends upon parties' intent, which is derived
from a fair and reasonable construction of
the language used in light of all the circumstances when the parties executed the contract.
5. Contracts «=»176(9)
Testimony by one lienholder was sufficient to support finding that, under contract, delivery of lien release by him was
not condition precedent to payment of $10,000 by other lienholder.
6. Set-Off and Counterclaim «=»60
Counterclaim was compulsory and lienholder's failure to file counterclaim resulted in waiver of issue of whether he was
damaged by other lienholder's alleged
breach of lien release agreement, where
counterclaim arose out of transaction that

was subject matter of other lienholder's
claim. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 13(a).
R. Douglas Credille, T. Quentin Cannon,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant
H. Ralph Klemm, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant Lewis E. Campbell seeks reversal of a judgment awarding plaintiff
Elden C. Kimball damages for breach of
contract. Campbell argues that the trial
court erred in considering parol evidence in
interpreting the terms of a written agreement between the parties. Campbell also
seeks a remand in order to pursue a counterclaim not asserted at trial for damages
arising out of Kimball's alleged reciprocal
breach of the contract. We hold that the
trial court did not err in considering parol
evidence and that the resulting findings
and conclusions are supported by substantial record evidence. We therefore affirm.
We also find no basis for a remand.
Both Kimball and Campbell held liens on
a piece of real property known as "The
Office." Both liens were lower in priority
than at least one other lien on the property
held by Murray First Thrift ("MFT").1
MFT had scheduled a trustee's sale. Prior
to the sale, Campbell purchased MFFs entire interest in The Office, but decided to
proceed with the trustee's sale to clear
subsequent liens.

to permit him to complete the purchase at
the $45,000 price. Campbell requested a
delay in bidding and offered to pay Kimball
$10,000 in consideration of the withdrawal
of his bid. Kimball accepted. The auctioneer then sold the property to Campbell by
rejecting Kimball's higher bid upon the fictional premise that he did not have the
$45,000.
After the sale, Kimball and Campbell
drew up a rather cryptic agreement providing that Kimball would withdraw his $45,000 bid and execute and deliver a lien release on The Office "forthwith" and that in
consideration, Campbell would pay Kimball
$10,000 on or before February 13, 1981.
The agreement was signed on January 22,
1981, after counsel for both parties reviewed it.
The trial court found that, at the time the
agreement was signed, the parties intended
that Kimball would execute and deliver the
lien release as soon as Campbell tendered
$10,000; that Kimball was at all times
ready to give the release upon receipt of
the $10,000; that Kimball contacted Campbell's attorney several times to ask if the
$10,000 was available and was told that it
was not; and that Kimball eventually gave
Campbell's attorney the lien release on or
about February 15th so that there would be
no hesitancy on Campbell's part to pay the
$10,000.

At the January 22, 1981 sale, Campbell
bid $43,000. To his surprise, Kimball then
b
»d $45,000. Kimball had adequate credit

Kimball and Campbell were the only witnesses at trial. Kimball testified to the
facts as found by the trial court, while
Campbell asserted that Kimball's obligation to furnish a release "forthwith" was a
condition precedent to his obligation to pay
the $10,000 and that his receipt of the lien
release on or before February 1, 1981, was
required by the term "forthwith." Kimball
testified that there was no such understanding. In essence, the parties' characterization of their intent regarding performance under the contract was flatly
contradictory.

* .***T w a s a trustee under two separate trust
deeds. The first was dated July 10, 1978, in the
amount of $30,162 and the second was dated
M
*y 16, 1979, in the amount of $32,174. The

judgment lien held by plaintiff was docketed on
April 16, 1979, in the amount of $35,000 and,
therefore, apparently came between MFTs first
and second liens on the property.

These facts are undisputed. However,
with minor exceptions, the remaining facts
were the subject of directly conflicting testimony between Campbell and Kimball.
The trial court accepted Kimball's version.
We recite the facts as found by the trial
court
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Prisoner was convicted in the Fourth
District Court, Miller County, David Sam,
J., of escape from a state prison and theft
of a vehicle. Prisoner appealed. The Supreme Court held that prisoner waj not
denied his right to a speedy trial and prisoner's trial was held within 120-day time
limit imposed by statute where prisoner's
trial was held 112 days after prisoner's
notice to warden of charges pending
against him.

3. Criminal Law *=»577.9
U.C.A. 1953, 77-29-1 which states tl
prisoner serving term of imprisonment
entitled to have charge brought to ti
within 120 days of prisoner's delivery
custodial officer of written notice reque
ing disposition of pending charge plac
burden on prisoner to give notice to ward
before prisoner is entitled to have t
charge disposed of within the statutory i
riod of time.
4. Criminal Law <&=>577.9
For purposes of determining wheth
prisoner was denied right to a speedy trii
120-day time limit imposed by U.C.A.196
77-29-1 did not commence on prisoner
notice of appearance where the noti<
merely contained a plea of not guilty and
request that prisoner be granted a trial ar
did not comport with statutory requiremei
of delivery to warden and did not specii
the nature of the charge or the court whei
the charge was pending. U.S.C.A. Cons
Amend. 6.

Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.

1. Criminal Law «=»577.5
/> Purpose of U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1 which
tates that prisoner serving a term of im* prisonment is entitled to have charge
brought to trial within 120 days of prison^
er's delivery to custodial officer of written
notice requesting disposition of pending
charge is to protect the constitutional right
of prisoners to a speedy trial and to compel
law enforcement authorities to properly
prosecute charges against prisoners. U.S.
C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
2. Criminal Law «=»577.5
Legislative expression of time limits
that constitute a speedy public trial under
State Constitution are represented in U.C.
A. 1953, 77-29-1 which states that prisoner
serving term of imprisonment is entitled to
have the charge brought to trial within 120
days of prisoner's delivery to custodial officer of written notice requesting disposition
of pending charge.

Milton T. Harman, Nephi, for defendar
and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lak
City, for plaintiff and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant appeals from the judgment oi
a jury verdict convicting him of escap<
from the state prison, a second degree felo
ny in violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-8309(1) and § 76-8-309(2Xb) (1978 ed.), an<
theft of a vehicle, a second degree felony ii
violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-404 anc
§ 76-6-412(lXaXii) (1978 ed.). We affirm
Defendant was a prisoner of the Utal
State Prison housed at the Millard Count}
Jail for work release from that facility
when he escaped in a stolen vehicle. He
was recaptured and returned to the county
jail on April 22, 1984. Throughout tht
following month his attorney filed a notice
of appearance, made request for discovery,
and filed motions to reduce charge and
sever counts. On May 30, 1984, defendant
delivered his "notice and request for dispo
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sition of pending charges" to the Utah
State Prison. On June 30, he filed his
motion to dismiss the action for failure to
prosecute in a timely manner. The motion
was denied. Trial was held on September
20.
The single issue before this court is
based upon defendant's claim that he was
denied his constitutional right to a speedy
trial. Defendant maintains that the notice
of appearance filed on April 24, 1984, constituted notice provided for in section 7729-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
that his trial was not held until 150 days
from the filing of that notice.
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-29-1 (1978 ed.) reads:
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a
term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and
there is pending against the prisoner
in this state any untried indictment or
information, and the prisoner shall
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of
the charge and the court wherein it is
pending and requesting disposition of
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to
trial within 120 days of the date of
delivery of written notice.
/
[l t 2J The purpose of the statute is to
protect the constitutional right of prisoners
to a speedy trial and to compel law enforcement authorities to promptly prosecute
charges against prisoners. State v. Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115 (1982); State v.
Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158
(1969) (stating the same purpose under former statute). This statutory scheme represents a legislative expression of the time
limits that constitute a speedy public trial
under the Utah Constitution. State v. Taylor, Utah, 538 P.2d 310 (1975), and the 120
day period commences to run from the date
of delivery of the written notice. Section
77-29-1, supra.
[3,4] Defendant's reliance on his notice
of appearance to commence the running of

the 120-day period is misplaced. The notice
merely contained a plea of "not guilty" and
a request that defendant be granted a trial
upon the charge. It did not comport with
the requirements of the statute, as it was
not delivered to the warden at the state
prison and did not specify the nature of the
charge or the court where the charge was
pending. Section 77-29-1 places the burden on the prisoner to give notice to the
warden before he is entitled to have the
charge disposed of within the statutory period of time. That was done on May 30,
1984. His trial was held 112 days later on
September 20 and was well within the time
set to guarantee him a speedy public trial.
Affirmed.

Corporation and some of the defendants
appealed. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) purported appeal was not from final
appealable order, where claims of breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, and failure to
obtain construction bond, as well as validity
of liens and amounts secured by liens remained to be adjudicated, and (2) appeal
therefore had to be dismissed and matter
remanded to trial court, where parties had
not availed themselves of procedures which
permit appeal of fewer than all claims or
parties but only after District Court certification, and review of interlocutory order
had not been granted.
Appeal dismissed; remanded.

STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

1. Appeal and Error e=>358
Parties to suit generally are entitled to
only one appeal as matter of right, regardless of number of parties or issues presented for disposition.
2. Appeal and Error «=>66
Appeal can be taken only from entry
of judgment that finally concludes action.

ALL WEATHER INSULATION, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
AMIRON DEVELOPMENT CORP., et
al., Defendants, Respondents, and
Cross-Appellants.
No. 19530.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 3, 1985.
Corporation brought action to collect
for materials furnished for condominium
construction project against record owner
of property, general contractor for project,
lender and trustee-beneficiary under trust
deed, and various individuals and small
businesses who had filed materialmen's
liens or mechanic's liens against property.
The Seventh District Court, Uintah County,
Richard C. Davidson, J., ruled that trust
deed had priority over all lien claimants.

3. Appeal and Error <s=»80(3)
Purported appeal was not from final
appealable order, where claims of breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, and failure to
obtain construction bond, as well as validity
of liens and amounts secured by liens remained to be adjudicated, even though district court's summary judgment established
lenders' priority over lien claimants' interests.
4. Appeal and Error «=>358, 366
Appeal, which was not from final appealable order, had to be dismissed and
matter remanded to trial court, where parties had not availed themselves of Civil
Rule 54(b) procedures which permit appeal
of fewer than all claims or parties but only
after district court certification, and review
of interlocutory order had not been granted
by the Supreme Court. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rules 54(b), 72(b); Rules App.Proc., Rule 5.
1. Two other lending institutions were also
named as assignees of part of the beneficial

Joseph R. Fox, Sandy, Gary H. Weij
Provo, for plaintiff and appellant.
Bruce A. Maak, Salt Lake City, for
fendants, respondents, and cross-ap]
lants.
PER CURIAM:
In August, 1982, plaintiff filed this acti
to collect for materials furnished for a cc
dominium construction project in Verm
Utah. The parties named as defendan
included the following: Amiron Develo
ment Corp., the record owner of the prope
ty; Herbert Bales, the general contract*
for the project; Basin State Bank, the lem
er and trustee-beneficiary under a trus
deed;' and various individuals and sma
businesses who had filed materialmen'
liens or mechanic's liens against the propei
ty. The four causes of action specified ii
the complaint were (1) lien foreclosure, (2
breach of contract, (3) failure to obtaii
bond, and (4) quantum meruit. Following i
series of answers, counterclaims, anc
cross-claims, the lenders filed a motion for
summary judgment.
After reviewing
memoranda and pleadings (including affidavits), the district court ruled that the trust
deed has priority over all lien claimants
since it was recorded on August 4, 1981,
and the "first visible work performed on
the job site" occurred after that date.
Separate notices of appeal were thereafter filed by plaintiff and by some of the
other defendants. Briefs on appeal focus
primarily on whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to when construction on the site actually began. We
do not address the merits of the appeal
since it is not from a final order.
[1-3] Parties to a suit generally are entitled to only one appeal as a matter of
right, regardless of the number of parties
or issues presented for dispostion. An appeal can be taken only from the entry of a
interest of Basin State Bank.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
***********

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 911400609
vs.
WILLIAM IRA LEON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant.
************

The Court having received the defendant's Motion to Dismiss
hereby denies such motion. The Court finds that defendant's
request for final disposition pursuant to Rule 77-29-1 UCA was
premature, because at the time of the filing there were no
indictments or information pending against the prisoner in this
state. State v. Farnsworth 519 P.2d 244 (Utah 1974).
The Court finds further that defendant's demand was
deficient because it did not specify the nature of the charge in
the Court where it is pending as required by Rule 77-29-1 UCA.
Counsel for the plaintiff to prepare an order within 15 days
of this decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to
submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision
has no effect until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 4th day of February, 1992.

cc:

Mark Brady, Esq.
D. John Mussleman, Esq.
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